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
Secure Group Communication in Constrained Networks

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
A Gap Analysis

IEEE Global IoT Summit 2017

Geneva, Switzerland





Since ~2013:
Several and long discussions about
Secure Group Communication
in IETF working groups (DICE, ACE, ...)




Toolbox for Secure Group Communication in constrained environments (e.g. IoT)



Devices	 Arduino Uno	 Arduino M0+	 Arduino Due	 ESP 8266	 Raspberry Pi (v1-v3) Banana Pi Beaglebone
Architecture	ATmega328	ARM Cortex-M0+	ARM Cortex-M3	Tensilica L106	ARMv6 – ARMv8
CPU	16 MHz	48 MHz	84 MHz	80-160 MHz	700-1200 MHz
RAM	2 KB	32 KB	96 KB	64 KB	256-1024 MB
Flash	32 KB	256 KB	512 KB	1 MB	
Operating System	RIOT OS	RIOT OS	RIOT OS	Free RTOS	Linux







Is there any formal
description for secure group
communication in
constrained networks?

IPsec

Tesla





→ Group communication includes most major IoT-related communication models

1:n communication

1:1 communication

→ Securing groups can help securing IoT in general

→ Group communication is a management problem!



n:1 communication

n:m communication

What is
“Secure Group Communication”

What is
“Secure Group Management”



Definition according to ISO/IEC 27000:

“information security

preservation of **confidentiality** (2.13), **integrity** (2.36) and **availability** (2.10) of information

NOTE In addition, other properties, such as **authenticity** (2.9), **accountability** (2.2), **non-repudiation** (2.49), and **reliability** (2.56) can also be involved.”

[ISO/IEC27000, 2.30]

Definition according to ISO 27000:

“information

preservation
informa

NOTE In
(2.2), no

confidentiality:

→ Data Encryption
(usually symmetric)

→ (Group) Key Distribution
→ to authorized members

integrity (2.36) and **availability** (2.10) of

such as **authenticity** (2.9), **accountability**
liability (2.56) can also be involved.”

[ISO/IEC27000, 2.30]

Definition according to ISO/IEC 27000:

“information security

preservation of **confidentiality** of information

NOTE In addition, other properties (2.2), **non-repudiation** (2.49),

integrity:

Cryptographic Signatures

- Group Integrity
- Key Distribution(!!!)
- Sender Integrity
- PKI

availability (2.10) of

), **accountability**

to be involved.”

[IEC27000, 2.30]

Definition according to ISO/IEC 27000:

“information security

preservation of **confidentiality** (2.13), **integrity** information

NOTE In addition, other properties, such as **aut** (2.2), **non-repudiation** (2.49), and **reliability** (2.

availability:

- Member can join group of
- **Group Management (GM)**
- AAI
- **Secure GM**

Definition according to ISO/IEC 27000:

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NOTE In addition, other properties (2.9), **accountability** (2.2), **non-repudiation** (2.49) also be involved.”

reliability:

- **Reliable** GM
- grant and revoke membership

[ISO/IEC27000, 2.30]

Definition according to ISO/IEC 27000:

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preservation of **confidentiality** (2.13), **integrity** (2.36) and **availability** (2.37) of information

NOTE In addition, other properties, such as **authenticity** (2.2), **non-repudiation** (2.49), and **reliability** (2.56) can be considered.

accountability:


- **Right Management**
- join, leave,
- create, destroy
- send messages

Definition according to ISO/IEC 27000:

“information security

preservation of **confidentiality** (2.13), **integrity** (2.11), **availability** (2.10) of information

NOTE In addition, other properties, such as **authenticity** (2.2), **non-repudiation** (2.49), and **accountability** (2.30) are also involved.”

- 
- Signatures **with sender identification**
 - Identity Management
 - Public Key Infrastructure

Definition according to ISO/IEC 27000:

“information security

preservation of **confidentiality** (2.13), **integrity** (2.36) and **availability** (2.10) of information.

NOT all properties, such as **authenticity** (2.9), **accountability** (2.35) and **reliability** (2.56) can also be involved.”

non-repudiation:

- Sender Authentication
- AND** Identity
- AND** Public Key Management
- Message ID (Seq. Nr)
- Acknowledgement (?)

[ISO/IEC27000, 2.30]

Related Work	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Authenticity	Accountability	Non-Repudiation	Reliability
III-A: Group CoAP (RFC 7390)	✗	✗	(✓) ^a	✗	✗	✗	✓
III-A: DICE (RFC 7925)	✗	✗	(✓) ^a	✗	✗	✗	✓
III-A: Group DTLS [3]	✓	(✓) ^b	✓	(✓) ^b	✓	✗ ^b	✓
III-B: IPsec	✓	(✓) ^b	(✓) ^a	(✓) ^b	✗	✗ ^b	✓
III-B: Group-DH [4]	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
III-C: EMSS [5]	✗	(✓) ^d	✗ ^c	(✓) ^d	✗	✓	✗ ^c
III-C: TESLA [5]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
III-C: μ TESLA [6]	✗	(✓) ^b	✓	(✓) ^b	✓	✗	✓
III-C: IBS [7]	✗	✓	✗ ^c	✓	✗	✗ ^e	✗
III-C: ABE [8]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗

legend: ✓ addressed by design (✓) partially addressed ✗ not addressed by design


^a unauthenticated group management

^b no message source authentication/integrity.

^c no group management


^d delayed signature verification

^e no anti-replay mechanism



- Secure Group Communication is a management problem
- We defined properties for Secure Group Management
- Analysis shows no existing „IoT-aware“ solution
- Research requires a solid testbed:
→ MNM-Team setup: www.mnm-team.org/projects/embedded





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